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35	Abstract	<p>Orientation (or reorientation) is the first step in navigation, because establishing a spatial frame of reference is essential for a sense of location and heading direction. Recent research on nonhuman animals has revealed that the vertical component of an environment provides an important source of spatial information, in both terrestrial and aquatic settings. Nonetheless, humans show large individual and sex differences in the ability to use terrain slope for reorientation. To understand why some participants—mainly women—exhibit a difficulty with slope, we tested reorientation in a richer environment than had been used previously, including both a tilted floor and a set of distinct objects that could be used as landmarks. This environment allowed for the use of two different strategies for solving the task, one based on directional cues (slope gradient) and one based on positional cues (landmarks). Overall, rather than using both cues, participants tended to focus on just one. Although men and women did not differ significantly in their encoding of or reliance on the two strategies, men showed greater confidence in solving the reorientation task. These facts suggest that one possible cause of the female difficulty with slope might be a generally lower spatial confidence during reorientation.</p>
36	Keywords separated by ' - '	Individual and sex differences - Spatial abilities - Reorientation - Slope - Geographical slant - Spatial confidence
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4 **Reorienting with terrain slope and landmarks**5 **Daniele Nardi · Nora S. Newcombe · Thomas F. Shipley**6  
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8  
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10 navigation, because establishing a spatial frame of reference  
11 is essential for a sense of location and heading direction.  
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15 aquatic settings. Nonetheless, humans show large individual  
16 and sex differences in the ability to use terrain slope for  
17 reorientation. To understand why some participants—mainly  
18 women—exhibit a difficulty with slope, we tested reori-  
19 entation in a richer environment than had been used  
20 previously, including both a tilted floor and a set of distinct  
21 objects that could be used as landmarks. This environment  
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23 task, one based on directional cues (slope gradient) and one  
24 based on positional cues (landmarks). Overall, rather than  
25 using both cues, participants tended to focus on just one.  
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28 showed greater confidence in solving the reorientation task.  
29 These facts suggest that one possible cause of the female  
30 difficulty with slope might be a generally lower spatial  
31 confidence during reorientation.

32 **Keywords** Individual and sex differences · Spatial abilities ·  
33 Reorientation · Slope · Geographical slant · Spatial confidence

34 Few everyday cognitive abilities exhibit individual differ- 34  
35 ences as marked as those seen in navigation tasks. It is 35  
36 apparent that some people are extremely good at finding 36  
37 their way, while others struggle and experience anxiety 37  
38 during the journey (e.g., Ishikawa & Montello, 2006; 38  
39 Lawton, 1994; Schinazi, Epstein, Nardi, Newcombe, & 39  
40 Shipley, 2009). The complexity of the navigation process 40  
41 makes it difficult to understand the source of such variability 41  
42 in performance—after all, successful navigation depends on 42  
43 many component skills (e.g., perception, spatial memory, 43  
44 position updating, and construction of a mental map of the 44  
45 environment). Here we focus on the first step that any 45  
46 mobile animal encounters when navigating: establishing 46  
47 where it is and which direction it is facing. This step, often 47  
48 called *orientation*, or *reorientation* when orientation has 48  
49 been lost, is accomplished when a navigator identifies a 49  
50 key element of the environment (e.g., a sign, specific land- 50  
51 mark, or familiar sound). 51

52 A central question in the reorientation literature is wheth- 52  
53 er any of these spatial cues has a more important role (is 53  
54 more salient) than others. For example, at least in small 54  
55 spaces, the geometric shape of the environment determined 55  
56 by bounding walls (e.g., in a room) seems to be a particu- 56  
57 larly strong type of reorienting cue—so strong that nonhu- 57  
58 man animals (Cheng, 1986) and human children (Hermer & 58  
59 Spelke, 1994, 1996) tend to focus on this cue and disregard 59  
60 other, potentially more useful cues. However, the strength of 60  
61 geometric cues appears to wane as the space grows larger 61  
62 (Learmonth, Nadel, & Newcombe, 2002), for a variety of 62  
63 reasons that include the potential for action in the space and 63  
64 the distance of the cues from the participant (Learmonth, 64  
65 Newcombe, Sheridan, & Jones, 2008). Another type of 65  
66 spatial information that has recently been shown to domi- 66  
67 nate reorientation and goal searching is the vertical extent of 67  
68 the environment. Both in terrestrial environments (for hom- 68  
69 ing pigeons, see Nardi, Nitsch, & Bingman, 2010; for rats, 69  
70 Jovalekic et al., 2011) and in volumes of water (for fish, see 70

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Holbrook & Burt de Perera, 2011), the vertical component of space seems to provide a very salient source of information and to be treated differently from the horizontal dimensions. In particular, pigeons use a uniform, sloping floor to reorient, even if other cues, such as the shape of the environment, are available (Nardi & Bingman, 2009) and are better predictors of the goal location (Nardi et al., 2010). The strong reliance on slope gradients is probably related to the increased effort of moving on inclines, and to the fact that navigating on tilted surfaces creates a multimodal sensory experience, as slope is simultaneously perceived by visual, kinesthetic, and vestibular receptors.

Despite the strong reliance on slope exhibited by nonhuman animals, the only human study on terrain slope reorientation carried out in a real environment showed surprising variability in performance, with a large percentage of the participants being unable to notice the incline and use it to locate a hidden goal (Nardi, Newcombe, & Shipley, 2011). Sex was found to be related to these individual differences, with men showing a performance advantage of 1.4 *SDs* over women—an effect size larger than that reported in most studies of mental rotation, a spatial skill characterized by large sex-related differences (Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden, 1995). Although comparisons with nonhuman animal results are hampered by the use of different inclinations (5° for humans, 20° for pigeons), the study of Nardi et al. (2011) shows that humans find it difficult to reorient using a slope gradient of moderate magnitude (5° is a common inclination used in wheelchair ramps). This finding is important because vertically extended surfaces are part of natural environments: The vertical topography of the land (a mountain, a valley) can be used to identify goal locations in the large scale, and—at least in the case of a uniform slope, like the side of a hill—the gradient establishes a stable, small-scale directional reference frame (e.g., “the house is uphill with respect to the school”).

To further our understanding of how people reorient by terrain slope and why it is apparently a difficult task, in the present experiment we provided an enriched testing environment as compared to that of Nardi et al. (2011). In the previous study, participants could use only the slope of the floor to reorient. Normally, however, objects are present in the environment and can be used as landmarks to gain a sense of orientation and for encoding a goal location. Thus, in this work, in addition to the slope of the terrain, we included a set of distinct landmarks. Reorientation by landmarks is well established and, at least for human adults, can be considered a simple task (e.g., Ratliff & Newcombe, 2008). By providing multiple strategies for reorientation—one slope-based and the other landmark-based—the present experiment could tease apart the general ability to reorient from the ability to use slope per se.

Reorientation by slope and landmark cues is a particularly interesting case, because slope and landmark are two distinct classes of spatial cues. A uniform terrain slope falls in the category of directional cues because the gradient provides the navigator with bearing information (like with a compass, north can be likened to uphill, south to downhill, etc.); local landmarks, instead, constitute positional cues, as they supply the navigator with both direction *and* distance information (e.g., a nonvisible target location can be estimated by a vector centered on a landmark). This distinction has been proposed by Jacobs and Schenk (2003), who also suggested that the sexes (not only in humans) might differently rely on these types of cues: males more on directional cues and females more on positional cues.

The (scarce) existing research on human reorientation and navigation in sloped environments has shown that the presence of a geographical slant (4° inclination) improves navigation performance in a landmark-rich virtual town (Restat, Steck, Mochnatzki, & Mallot, 2004); furthermore, it has also provided evidence that, indeed, men tend to focus more than women on directional cues—including, but not limited to, terrain slope (30° inclination; Chai & Jacobs, 2009, 2010). Crucially, however, these studies employed virtual environments, which deprive participants of the full set of sensory information available in the real world for the perception of tilt. In the Restat et al. study, the environment was presented on a large screen and participants used a bicycle simulator that enabled slant perception on the basis of effort (through force feedback), but not on the basis of body posture (the tilt of the bicycle did not vary according to the slope); in Chai and Jacobs’s (2009, 2010) studies, the environment was experienced through desktop monitors, providing only the visual component of slope information. In the present experiment, we used a real sloped enclosure; walking in this apparatus enabled participants to perceive the full set of visual, kinesthetic, and vestibular stimuli associated with tilt. Therefore, by using a real environment and by including landmarks, we were able to examine reorientation with a more naturalistic experience of a sloped terrain. Our main purpose was to assess how people use these two types of cues (slope and landmarks) and whether, using sex as a proxy, there are related individual differences in their use.

Undergraduate students were taken through a reorientation task in which, after being spun on a swivel chair with the blindfold on, they had to find a target hidden in one of the corners of a tilted, square enclosure. In each corner was a black-and-white card with a distinct pattern that could be used to identify the target location; the differences among these patterns were recognizable but subtle, as ascertained through pilot studies, so that the task was not too easy. Therefore, unlike in our previous experiment (Nardi et al., 2011), participants could use both the slope of the floor

177 (e.g., “the target is uphill/left”) and a set of landmarks (e.g.,  
 178 “the target is near this card, or opposite that other card”) to  
 179 encode the goal (see Fig. 1). The reorientation task was  
 180 carried out for two reinforced trials in which the goal was  
 181 always in the same corner (referred to as “training trials”).  
 182 After this, two types of unreinforced tests were carried out.  
 183 In the conflict tests, the set of cards and the slope predicted  
 184 two different target locations, so that participants’ choices  
 185 would reveal their reliance on the landmark strategy or the  
 186 slope strategy. In the single-cue tests, only one of the cues  
 187 was available (slope was available in the real-world task,  
 188 and landmarks were available in a paper-and-pencil version  
 189 of the task); therefore, it could be deduced whether partic-  
 190 ipants encoded the cue and could use it to reorient.


191 Most of the experimental paradigms in the literature of  
 192 reorientation have used discrete choices among distinct,  
 193 potential target locations (typically, the corners of an en-  
 194 closure) as the dependent variable (for a review, see Cheng &  
 195 Newcombe, 2005). Here participants, in addition to discrete  
 196 choices, provided also a measure of confidence for each  
 197 hiding location. In each trial, they had a total of ten confi-  
 198 dence points (CPs) that they could allot among as many  
 199 locations as they wanted—the more CPs a location was  
 200 assigned, the greater the confidence for that specific

location. In this way, we could estimate the level of confi-  
 201 dence displayed during the task, and we had a more graded  
 202 measure for how slope and landmark cues are taken into  
 203 account in the reorientation process. In particular, as a  
 204 secondary goal of this study, we could examine whether,  
 205 during the conflict tests, people showed signs of using a  
 206 combination of both cues (e.g., spreading the CPs between  
 207 the locations associated with slope and landmark) or univ-  
 208 cally relied on one (e.g., allotting all CPs to one location).  
 209

**Method**

Apparatus

The apparatus was the same as the one used in Nardi et al.  
 212 (2011). The experimental enclosure measured 244 × 244 cm  
 213 and was 203 cm high (see Fig. 1); it was placed inside a  
 214 room measuring 290 × 460 cm that was 250 cm high. The  
 215 floor of the enclosure consisted of a wooden platform (244 ×  
 216 244 cm, 12 cm thick), covered by gray carpet. White sheets  
 217 on a PVC pipe frame composed the walls and the ceiling of  
 218 the enclosure. The enclosure was tilted at an inclination of  
 219 5° (the same inclination used in Nardi et al., 2011). On the  
 220



**Fig. 1** Schematic representation of the experimental enclosure, viewed from the side and from the top. Four laminated cards with distinct, black-and-white patterns were placed in the corners of the enclosure and could be used as landmarks to determine the target location. The cards are not represented at scale; they are larger here for clarity. The four cards were always arranged in the same configuration, and the one associated with the target was the same for all participants (the card

represented here in the upper left corner). During the conflict tests, the cards were rotated clockwise and counterclockwise as a whole array (still preserving their configuration). During the slope test, the cards were removed. During the landmark test, this top view of the enclosure was presented to the participant on a sheet of paper, with this exact configuration of the cards (“uphill” and “downhill” were omitted)

221 floor of the enclosure, in each corner was a 25-W lamp  
222 (approximate dimensions: 11 × 11 cm, 18 cm high) and a  
223 red bowl placed upside down (16 cm in diameter, 8 cm  
224 deep), which constituted the hiding place for the target. In  
225 front of the red bowls, on the floor were placed the landmark  
226 cues; they were four 11 × 11 cm laminated cards with  
227 distinct black-and-white patterns (see Fig. 1). A swivel chair  
228 was placed in the center of the enclosure (base, 56 cm in  
229 diameter; total height, 110 cm). A wedge was placed under  
230 the chair such that the chair's axis of rotation was always  
231 parallel to the force of gravity. The bottom of the chair was  
232 covered with a square piece of white cloth (61 × 61 cm) that  
233 covered the legs of the chair and the wedge. It is impor-  
234 tant to note that, when spinning on the swivel chair, the  
235 participants' feet never touched the floor, so no cues were  
236 available for keeping track of their position relative to the  
237 slope.

### 238 Participants

239 The participants were 40 male and 40 female Temple  
240 University undergraduate students, from the ages of 18 to  
241 30, who volunteered as a means of fulfilling course require-  
242 ments. The sample included 61.3 % White participants,  
243 16.3 % African-Americans, 12.5 % Asians, 5.0 %  
244 Hispanics, 2.5 % of other minorities, and 2.5 % undeclared.  
245 The average ages were 21.4 for males ( $SD = 5.4$ ) and 20.5  
246 for females ( $SD = 2.8$ ). Participants signed up for the exper-  
247 iment through a website, on which they were told to wear  
248 comfortable shoes and that heels were not allowed. Before  
249 starting the experiment, participants signed the consent  
250 form.

### 251 Procedure

252 *Training trials* Each participant wore a blindfold and was  
253 led by the experimenter into the room and into the enclo-  
254 sure. The participant sat on the swivel chair and was spun  
255 around for about 30 s. After this, the participant took off the  
256 blindfold and was asked to walk around the enclosure to get  
257 acquainted with it; this procedure was carried out to facili-  
258 tate the perception of the slope for the participant. The  
259 experimenter then showed the target (a \$1 bill) and said, "I  
260 will hide this under one of the bowls in the corners; your job  
261 is to try to remember where it is, and after being spun on the  
262 chair, you will have to find it." The participant was also told  
263 that, apart from making a discrete choice, he or she would  
264 have to allot ten confidence points (CPs) on the basis of his  
265 or her confidence in each corner. The experimenter said, "if  
266 you are completely sure that the target is in one corner, you  
267 can give ten points to that corner; if instead you are some-  
268 how uncertain between two or more corners, you can sub-  
269 divide those points, giving more points to the corner you are

more confident of." The experimenter then gave a couple of 270  
examples and ascertained that the participant understood 271  
how to allot the CPs. No instruction was given as to which 272  
cue to use to encode the target location, but the experimenter 273  
said that, during the disorientation procedure, the curtains 274  
and cloth under the chair would be moved; in this way, 275  
participants were discouraged from using uncontrolled 276  
details (wrinkles, creases) on the sheets or on the cloth under 277  
the chair. To encode the goal location, the participants could 278  
take as much time and walk as much as they wanted. The 279  
experimenter caught the attention of the participant and 280  
placed the target under one bowl; when ready, the partici- 281  
pant sat on the chair, put on the blindfold, and was disori- 282  
ented. Spinning occurred for about 1 min, changing 283  
direction and speed of rotation. During the disorientation 284  
procedure, the experimenter moved the sheets that com- 285  
posed the walls of the enclosure (each sheet was moved to 286  
the adjacent side, clockwise) and readjusted the cloth under 287  
the chair, in case it had been moved by the participant's feet. 288  
After being spun, the participant took off the blindfold, 289  
stood up and was asked, "can you tell me where I hid the 290  
target?" The participant was told to take as much time and to 291  
walk around as much as he or she wanted; when ready, the 292  
participant would have to allot the CPs and make the dis- 293  
crete choice, and then would have to walk to the chosen 294  
bowl and uncover it to see if the target was there. If the 295  
choice was incorrect, the experimenter uncovered the cor- 296  
rect bowl and showed the target. This procedure was repeat- 297  
ed for another trial (a total of two training trials), with the 298  
target always in the same corner (reference memory para- 299  
digm). In each trial, the participant started facing a different 300  
side of the enclosure (in counterbalanced orders across each 301  
sex), and the experimenter always stood at the back of the 302  
chair. The location of the target with respect to the slope 303  
gradient was counterbalanced across all four corners for 304  
each sex. The four cards were always arranged in the same 305  
configuration, and the one associated with the target was the 306  
same for all participants (see Fig. 1). 307

*Conflict tests* After learning the goal location in the two 308  
training trials, the participants were told that, from now 309  
on, they would not get to see where the target was, but that 310  
it would always be in the same place as it had been before. 311  
The conflict tests consisted of two trials; they were the same 312  
as the training trials, except that now the participant did not 313  
receive any feedback. While the participant was being spun 314  
on the chair, the experimenter moved the set of landmark 315  
cards. In one conflict trial, the landmark array was rotated 316  
clockwise by 90°, and in the other trial, it was rotated 317  
counterclockwise by 90° relative to its initial position. The 318  
configuration of the cards was preserved—the configuration 319  
was rotated as a whole array. The end result was that, in one 320  
conflict trial, the landmark card associated with the goal was 321

322 displaced horizontally relative to the slope (in a corner with  
 323 the same elevation, but different on the left–right axis), and  
 324 in the other trial it was displaced vertically (different eleva-  
 325 tion, but same position on the left–right axis). Participants  
 326 allotted the CPs and made the discrete choice in the same  
 327 way as in the training trials. The facing orientations varied  
 328 and were counterbalanced across sexes. Also, the trial order  
 329 was counterbalanced, with half of the sample (20 female and  
 330 20 male participants) receiving first a horizontal displace-  
 331 ment trial (for convenience, referred to as *regular order*),  
 332 and the other half receiving first a vertical displacement trial  
 333 (for convenience, referred to as *reverse order*). The purpose  
 334 of these trials was to create a conflict between the two  
 335 sources of spatial information learned during the training  
 336 trials; now, the landmarks and the slope information dictated  
 337 two different goal locations, and on the basis of the CPs  
 338 allotted and the discrete choices, the preferred reorientation  
 339 strategies of the participants could be inferred.

340 *Slope test* After the conflict trials, one slope test trial was  
 341 carried out. This followed the same procedure as a conflict  
 342 trial, except that now the landmark cards were not present  
 343 (the experimenter removed them while the participant was  
 344 being disoriented). The purpose of this test was to dissociate  
 345 slope from the landmark cues; here, only slope information  
 346 was available, allowing for an assessment of whether the  
 347 participants encoded a slope-based representation of the  
 348 goal at all. After this trial, the real-world portion of the  
 349 experiment was completed, and the participant left the  
 350 enclosure.

351 *Paper-and-pencil tests* In order to examine the correlates of  
 352 reorientation, in another room each participant took a bat-  
 353 tery of tests that involved different spatial abilities. These  
 354 paper tests were always placed flat on the desk. The tests  
 355 included the following:

- 356 1. A *spatial-orientation test* (SOT; Kozhevnikov &  
 357 Hegarty, 2001; we used the revised version created by  
 358 Hegarty & Waller, 2004). This test assesses the ability to  
 359 imagine different orientations or perspectives in space.
- 360 2. A *water-level test* (WLT; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956; we  
 361 used the test devised by Liben, 1995). This test assesses  
 362 the use of the gravity reference frame for inferring the  
 363 level of a liquid in a tilted bottle.
- 364 3. A *questionnaire on experience with directional cues*,  
 365 with two questions, each composed of two opposite  
 366 statements. Participants had to express their agreement  
 367 with either statement on a scale from 0 (*total agreement*  
 368 *with the first statement*) to 10 (*total agreement with the*  
 369 *second statement*). The first question was composed of  
 370 these two statements: “Where I grew up, I could find my  
 371 way based on the slope of the terrain (e.g., going uphill

- or downhill),” and “Where I grew up, the slope of the  
 terrain was not meaningful to me (or not present at all).”  
 The second question was composed of these two state-  
 ments: “Where I grew up, I had no idea where North,  
 South, East and West were,” and “Where I grew up, I  
 usually knew where North, South, East and West were.”
4. A *questionnaire on heel use* (only for females), in which  
 participants had to express how often they wore heeled  
 footwear (on a scale from 1 to 7) and to give percent-  
 ages of low-, medium-, and high-heel use.
  5. A *landmark test*, relative to the real-world task carried  
 out in the tilted enclosure. On a sheet of paper was  
 represented the square experimental enclosure, with  
 four bowls and the landmark array in the corners, just  
 as in Fig. 1 (same configuration of cards as in the real-  
 world task, and in an identical rotation for all partici-  
 pants); no information on the direction of the slope  
 gradient relative to the enclosure was provided. On the  
 basis of the landmark cues, the participant had to write  
 down where the target had been hidden during the  
 reorientation task and had to allot CPs and make a  
 discrete choice, just like during the real-world task.  
 This landmark test dissociated landmark cues from  
 slope, and therefore it could be used to infer whether  
 the participant encoded a landmark-based representation  
 of the goal during the reorientation task. As this test was  
 complementary to the slope test, these two tests are  
 referred to as *single-cue tests*.

One participant’s paper-and-pencil tests (all except the  
 landmark test) were lost, so they are not taken into account  
 in any analysis.

*Summary of procedure* The real-world tasks consisted of  
 training (two trials), the conflict tests (two trials), and the  
 slope test (one trial). The paper-and-pencil tasks consisted of  
 the spatial orientation test, water-level test, questionnaire on  
 experience with directions, questionnaire on heel use, and  
 landmark test. (The slope and landmark tests are referred to  
 as *single-cue tests*.) The experimental session lasted 45–  
 50 min from initial instruction to debriefing; the time  
 elapsed between the first trial (training) and the landmark  
 test was approximately 35 min.

**Results**

Training

Performance in the training trials was analyzed with a two-  
 factor mixed ANOVA, with CPs as the dependent variable,  
 Training Trials as the within-subjects factor, and Sex as a  
 between-subjects factor. CPs for the correct hiding place



421 increased only marginally from Trial 1 to Trial 2,  $F(1, 78) =$   
 422  $3.280, MSE = 5.152, p = .074, \eta_p^2 = .040$ . The men allotted  
 423 significantly more CPs to the correct corner than did the  
 424 women,  $F(1, 78) = 4.742, MSE = 20.594, p = .032, \eta_p^2 =$   
 425  $.057$ , and we found no sex-by-trial interaction,  $F(1, 78) =$   
 426  $0.098, p = .755, \eta_p^2 = .001$  (see Fig. 2).

427 In the first trial, 72.5 % of the participants chose the  
 428 correct hiding place, and in the second trial, 77.5 % chose  
 429 it; this difference was not significant,  $\chi^2(1, n = 160) = 0.53,$   
 430  $p = .465$ . Breaking down the sample by sex, the frequencies  
 431 of correct choices were not significantly different between  
 432 men and women for either Trial 1,  $\chi^2(1, n = 80) = 1.00, p =$   
 433  $.317$ , or Trial 2,  $\chi^2(1, n = 80) = 2.58, p = .108$  (see Fig. 2).  
 434 Overall, the number of correct choices made during training  
 435 (0, 1, or 2) did not differ between the sexes,  $t(78) = 1.59,$   
 436  $p = .117, d = 0.35$ .

437 Dividing the sample on the basis of the strategy used  
 438 during the conflict tests (see below), the frequency of correct  
 439 choices was significantly above chance (25 % correct) for  
 440 all strategy groups (binomial test,  $ps < .001$ ). However, the  
 441 numbers of correct choices during training were significant-  
 442 ly different among the strategy groups,  $F(2, 77) = 7.80,$   
 443  $MSE = .432, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .169$ . The neither-strategy  
 444 group chose the correct corner significantly less than did  
 445 either the slope-strategy (Sidak,  $p < .05$ ) or the landmark-  
 446 strategy (Sidak,  $p < .01$ ) group. There was no significant  
 447 difference between the landmark- and slope-strategy group  
 448 (Sidak,  $p = .182$ ). Similarly, considering the CPs allotted to  
 449 the correct corner during training, there was a significant  
 450 difference among the strategy groups,  $F(2, 77) = 13.962,$   
 451  $MSE = 16.240, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .266$ . The CPs allotted to the  
 452 correct corner were not significantly different between the  
 453 landmark-strategy and slope-strategy groups (Sidak,  $p =$   
 454  $.280$ ), but for both groups the CPs allotted to the correct  
 455 corner were significantly higher than the CPs allotted by the  
 456 neither-strategy group (Sidak,  $ps < .01$ ). The interaction  
 457 between training trial and strategy group was not significant,  
 458  $F(2, 77) = 1.721, MSE = 5.002, p = .186, \eta_p^2 = .043$ .


Conflict tests


459

460 *Strategy preference* On the basis of their discrete choices  
 461 during the conflict trials, participants were categorized into  
 462 three groups. If they consistently chose the slope-correct lo-  
 463 cation on both trials, they were considered to be in the “slope-  
 464 strategy” group; if they consistently chose the landmark-  
 465 correct location, they were considered to be in the “land-  
 466 mark-strategy” group; if they did not consistently choose a  
 467 location that was correct according to a type of cue, they were  
 468 considered to be in the “neither-strategy” group. The frequen-  
 469 cies of participants in these categories are shown in Fig. 3, and  
 470 these proportions do not deviate significantly from a homo-  
 471 geneous distribution,  $\chi^2(2, n = 80) = 0.475, p = .789$ , suggest-  
 472 ing that one cue did not guide reorientation for everyone, but  
 473 that the two strategies were similarly accessible. Furthermore,  
 474 the frequency distributions were not significantly different  
 475 between men and women,  $\chi^2(2, n = 80) = 2.84, p = .241,$   
 476 and, when breaking down the sample by conflict trial order  
 477 (regular—i.e., first a horizontal displacement trial—or reverse  
 478 —i.e., first a vertical displacement trial), the difference be-  
 479 tween distributions of strategy preferences was not significant,  
 480  $\chi^2(2, n = 80) = 4.52, p = .105$ .

481 Considering the neither-strategy group, out of the 24 par-  
 482 ticipants who fell into this category, only six of the participants  
 483 chose a correct corner in both conflict trials (oscillating be-  
 484 tween the slope-correct corner in one trial and the landmark-  
 485 correct in the other); most of the participants (14) chose a  
 486 correct corner in just one of the conflict trials, and the remain-  
 487 ing ones (four) did not choose a correct location in either trial.  
 488 Considering the discrete choices to a correct corner in both  
 489 conflict trials, we did not find a significant preference of the  
 490 neither-strategy group for the slope-correct (11 choices out of  
 491 48) or the landmark-correct (15 out of 48) corner (binomial  
 492 test,  $p = .557$ ). The overall frequencies of participants who  
 493 consistently chose one strategy, who oscillated between the  
 494 two strategies, or who at least once chose an incorrect corner  
 495 are represented in Fig. 4.

**Fig. 2** Performance during the two training trials. On the left-hand side, the mean confidence points (CPs) allotted to the correct corner are shown ( $\pm 1 SD$ ); men were significantly more confident about the goal location than were women. On the right-hand side, the percentages of participants making a discrete choice to the correct corner are shown; the difference between sexes is not significant





**Fig. 3** Strategy use during the two conflict trials: Percentages of participants making discrete choices consistently to the slope-correct corner (“slope strategy”), consistently to the landmark-correct corner (“landmark strategy”), or not consistently choosing a corner that was correct according to any type of cue (“neither strategy”). There was no significant difference between sexes in the distributions of strategy use


496 In order to specifically compare men’s and women’s  
 497 reliance on slope, we considered for each participant the  
 498 number of slope-correct choices made in the conflict trials  
 499 (~~zero, one, or two~~); these were not significantly different  
 500 between the sexes,  $t(78) = 1.10, p = .274, d = 0.25$ .  
 501 Furthermore, cue reliance was not significantly different  
 502 between the sexes if we considered the number of  
 503 landmark-correct choices,  $t(78) = 0.87, p = .389, d = 0.19$ .

504 If, instead of considering the strategy preference *per*  
 505 *participant*, we took into account each and every discrete  
 506 choice separately for the two conflict trials (a total of 160  
 507 choices) and coded them as slope-correct, landmark-correct,  
 508 or incorrect choice, the frequency of incorrect choices (22  
 509 out of 160) was significantly less than the frequencies of  
 510 either slope-correct (65 out of 160; binomial test,  $p < .001$ )  
 511 or landmark-correct (73 out of 160; binomial test,  $p < .001$ )  
 512 choices, whereas there was no significant difference be-  
 513 tween the frequencies of slope-correct and landmark-  
 514 correct choices (binomial test,  $p = .551$ ). This suggests,

again, that the two strategies were used in similar proportions. Furthermore, there was no significant difference in strategy preference distributions when comparing the sexes,  $\chi^2(2, n = 160) = 2.10, p = .350$ , or trial order groups,  $\chi^2(2, n = 160) = 3.84, p = .147$ .

*Cue weighting* Considering the CPs allotted in the conflict trials, 55.0 % of participants in the first trial, and 60.0 % in the second trial, allotted all of their CPs (ten out of ten) to just one correct corner (whether slope-correct or landmark-correct). In contrast, CPs were broken down between the two correct corners by only 12.5 % of the participants in the first conflict trial, and by 10.0 % in the second conflict trial. The remaining participants (32.5 % in the first trial and 30.0 % in the second trial) allotted at least some CPs to an incorrect corner. These frequency distributions are represented in Fig. 4, averaged between the two conflict trials.

Considering the whole sample, there was not a significant difference between the CPs allotted to the slope-correct and landmark-correct corners [first conflict trial,  $t(79) = 1.26, p = .211, d = 0.26$ ; second conflict trial,  $t(79) = 0.43, p = .670, d = 0.09$ ]; however, each strategy group allotted the preponderance of CPs to the corner associated with the strategy that they were using. Participants in the landmark-strategy group allotted, in both conflict trials, 95.8 % of their cumulative CPs to the landmark-correct corner, and only 1.1 % to the other correct corner (slope-correct). Similarly, participants in the slope-strategy group allotted 86.6 % of their cumulative CPs to the slope-correct corner, and only 6.2 % to the other correct corner (landmark-correct). In contrast, the neither-strategy group divided their cumulative CPs approximately equally among the correct corners (51.4 %) and the incorrect ones (48.6 %; binomial test,  $p = .553$ ); their cumulative CPs were also divided approximately equally between the slope-correct (24.9 %) and landmark-correct (26.5 %) corners (binomial test,  $p = .655$ ).



**Fig. 4** Weighting of slope and landmark cues during the two conflict trials. On the left-hand side, the percentages of participants making discrete choices consistently to the same type of correct corner (in either slope- or landmark-correct trials), oscillating between the two types of correct corners (in one trial, slope-correct, and in the other, landmark-correct), or choosing at least once an incorrect corner. On the

right-hand side are the percentages of participants who allotted the whole set of CPs to just one correct corner (slope- or landmark-correct), who divided their CPs between the two correct corners, or who allotted at least some CPs to an incorrect corner (the data are averaged throughout the two conflict trials)

551 Again, in order to compare strategy use between the sexes,  
 552 we analyzed the CPs allotted to the slope-correct corner during  
 553 the conflict trials. There was no significant difference between  
 554 trials [ $F(1, 76) = 0.226, MSE = 4.329, p = .636, \eta_p^2 = .003$ ], no  
 555 significant effect of order [regular or reverse;  $F(1, 76) = 1.963,$   
 556  $MSE = 30.267, p = .165, \eta_p^2 = .025$ ], and no significant effect  
 557 of sex [ $F(1, 76) = 2.521, p = .116, \eta_p^2 = .032$ ]; furthermore, the  
 558 interactions were not significant ( $ps > .116$ ). The same result  
 559 emerged if we analyzed the CPs allotted to the landmark-  
 560 correct corner: There were no significant differences  
 561 between trials [ $F(1, 76) = 0.353, MSE = 5.733, p =$   
 562  $.554, \eta_p^2 = .005$ ], no significant effects of order [ $F(1,$   
 563  $76) = 0.669, MSE = 35.933, p = .416, \eta_p^2 = .009$ ] and  
 564 sex [ $F(1, 76) = 0.507, p = .479, \eta_p^2 = .007$ ], and no  
 565 significant interactions ( $ps > .325$ ).

567 Single-cue tests


568 Performance in the two single-cue tests was compared using  
 569 a 2 (men vs. women) by 2 (slope test vs. landmark test)  
 570 mixed ANOVA on the CPs allotted to the correct corner  
 571 (Fig. 5). There was no significant effect of test [ $F(1, 78) =$   
 572  $2.41, MSE = 18.52, p = .125, \eta_p^2 = .030$ ], suggesting that the  
 573 two cues were not encoded differently; furthermore, there  
 574 was no effect of sex [ $F(1, 78) = 0.02, MSE = 13.14, p =$   
 575  $.888, \eta_p^2 = .000$ ], indicating that men and women did not  
 576 have different cue encoding preferences; finally, the sex-by-  
 577 test interaction was also not significant,  $F(1, 78) = 2.30, p =$

.133,  $\eta_p^2 = .029$ . The correlation between the CPs allotted to  
 the correct corners in the slope and landmark tests was not  
 significant, considering the overall sample,  $r(78) = -.184,$   
 $p = .102$ . However, when considering only participants who  
 clearly were following a strategy (i.e., excluding the neither-  
 strategy group), we did find a significant negative correla-  
 tion between CPs allotted to the correct corner in the two  
 single-cue tests,  $r(54) = -.534, p < .001$ ; this suggests that  
 the more confident a participant was about the encoding  
 of one cue, the less confident he or she was about the  
 other. This significance holds even when controlling for  
 sex,  $r(53) = -.511, p < .001$ .

When analyzing specifically the CPs allotted to the correct  
 corner in the slope test (Fig. 5), there was a significant effect of  
 order,  $F(1, 76) = 7.660, MSE = 12.781, p = .007, \eta_p^2 = .092,$   
 and the effect of sex was not significant,  $F(1, 76) = 1.937, p =$   
 $.168, \eta_p^2 = .025$ ; however, the sex-by-order interaction was  
 significant,  $F(1, 76) = 4.861, p = .030, \eta_p^2 = .060,$  and  
 therefore we analyzed the simple effects. Male participants  
 allotted significantly more CPs to the slope-correct corner in  
 the reverse group (with a vertical-displacement conflict  
 trial first) than in the regular order group (with a  
 horizontal-displacement trial first;  $p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .140$ );  
 the order of the conflict trials (regular or reverse) did not  
 affect the performance in the slope test for female partic-  
 ipants ( $p = .692, \eta_p^2 = .002$ ).

The CPs allotted to the correct corner in the landmark test  
 were not significantly affected by order [ $F(1, 76) = 0.035,$

**Fig. 5** Results of the single-cue tests. The top left graph shows the mean CPs ( $\pm 1$  SD) allotted to the correct corners in the slope test and the landmark test; there was not a significant difference between sexes in either test, nor a significant sex-by-test interaction. The top right graph shows the percentages of participants making a correct discrete choice in the slope test and the landmark test; the frequencies were not significantly different between the sexes. The bottom graph shows the percentages of participants making a correct discrete choice in both tests, in only the slope test, in only the landmark test, or in neither test; there was not a significant difference between sexes in the distribution. Note that, while the slope test was a real-world task, the landmark test was a paper version of the task



606  $MSE = 17.563, p = .852, \eta_p^2 = .000$ ] or sex [ $F(1, 76) = 1.028,$   
 607  $p = .314, \eta_p^2 = .013$ ], and the sex-by-order interaction was not  
 608 significant [ $F(1, 76) = 0.139, p = .710, \eta_p^2 = .002$ ] (Fig. 5).

609 Discrete choices in the single-cue tests are also shown in  
 610 Fig. 5, and they reveal no significant sex differences in the  
 611 encoding of the slope and landmark cues. The distributions  
 612 of correct choices in the two single-cue tests were not  
 613 significantly different between men and women,  $\chi^2(1, n =$   
 614  $97) = 0.800, p = .371$ . Furthermore, in the slope test, the  
 615 frequencies of participants who chose the correct corner did  
 616 not significantly differ between sexes,  $\chi^2(1, n = 80) = 0.457,$   
 617  $p = .499$ , or between conflict trial order groups,  $\chi^2(1, n =$   
 618  $80) = 2.489, p = .115$ . In the same way, in the landmark test,  
 619 the frequencies of participants who chose the correct corner  
 620 did not significantly differ between sexes,  $\chi^2(1, n = 80) =$   
 621  $1.978, p = .160$ , or between conflict trial order groups,  $\chi^2(1,$   
 622  $n = 80) = 0.0, p = 1$ . The frequencies of correct choices in  
 623 each test were significantly above chance for both male and  
 624 female participants (binomial test,  $ps < .001$ ). Finally, con-  
 625 sidering the distribution of participants who chose the cor-  
 626 rect corner in the slope test only, in the landmark test only, in  
 627 both tests, or in neither test, we also found no significant  
 628 differences between the sexes,  $\chi^2(3, n = 80) = 4.737, p =$   
 629  $.192$ , or between conflict trial order groups,  $\chi^2(3, n = 80) =$   
 630  $3.493, p = .322$ .

631 Correlates of performance

632 In order to better understand the individual differences in  
 633 reorientation, we looked into the correlates of performance.  
 634 Because, as mentioned above, there were no significant  
 635 differences between the CPs allotted to the correct locations  
 636 in the two training trials, an aggregated value was used for  
 637 each participant (the sum of the CPs for the two training  
 638 trials). In the same way, an aggregated value was used to  
 639 capture confidence for the slope-correct and the landmark-  
 640 correct corners in the conflict trials (the sum of the CPs  
 641 allotted to the slope-correct and landmark-correct corners,  
 642 respectively, in the two conflict trials). These correlations  
 643 are summarized in Fig. 6. Performance in the reorientation  
 644 task, as measured by CPs allotted to the correct corner in the  
 645 training trials, correlated significantly with CPs allotted to the  
 646 landmark-correct corner during the conflict trials [ $r(78) =$   
 647  $.395, p < .001$ ]; this indicates that, in general, participants  
 648 who were more confident in solving the task were more  
 649 certain about the target location based on landmark cues (in  
 650 other words, they were more confident in relying on the  
 651 landmark strategy). Furthermore, performance in the task  
 652 correlated with CPs allotted to the correct corner in both  
 653 single-cue tests [slope test,  $r(78) = .243, p = .030$ ; landmark  
 654 test,  $r(78) = .508, p < .001$ ]; this indicates that better perform-  
 655 ers were more confident in locating the target when either cue  
 656 was presented in isolation.

657 Considering the paper-and-pencil tests, the WLT was not  
 658 significantly different between sexes,  $t(77) = 1.23, p = .223,$   
 659  $d = 0.28$ , whereas in the SOT, men were significantly more  
 660 accurate than women,  $t(77) = 2.25, p = .028, d = 0.50$ . The  
 661 questionnaire on directional experience did not reveal a  
 662 significant sex difference relative to Question 1,  $t(77) =$   
 663  $1.59, p = .116, d = 0.36$ , and revealed only a marginally  
 664 significant difference for Question 2,  $t(77) = 1.74, p = .087,$   
 665  $d = 0.39$  (men agreed marginally more than women with the  
 666 statement “Where I grew up, I usually knew where North,  
 667 South, East and West were”).

668 Both the WLT [ $r(77) = .259, p = .021$ ] and the SOT [ $r(77) =$   
 669  $-.450, p < .001$ ] correlated significantly with performance in  
 670 the reorientation task (training trials). Furthermore, the WLT  
 671 correlated with CPs allotted to the slope-correct corner in the  
 672 conflict trials [ $r(77) = .236, p = .037$ ], and with the CPs allotted  
 673 to the correct corner in the slope test [ $r(77) = .298, p = .008$ ]; in  
 674 contrast, the SOT correlated with CPs allotted to the correct  
 675 corner in the landmark test [ $r(77) = -.405, p < .001$ ].

676 Neither the questionnaire on heel use nor the one on  
 677 directional experience correlated with any measure in the  
 678 experiment.

679 **Discussion**

680 This study was designed to examine how people reorient in  
 681 a sloped environment when they also have the possibility of  
 682 using landmark cues. We used the same apparatus and  
 683 inclination as Nardi et al. (2011), except for one crucial  
 684 difference: A set of distinct objects were provided, which  
 685 could be used as landmarks to encode the target location.  
 686 Therefore, for the first time in a real-world experiment, men  
 687 and women could use either a slope strategy or a landmark  
 688 strategy to solve a reorientation task. This addition made the  
 689 task easier to solve; in fact, comparing the two training trials  
 690 of the present experiment with the first two training trials of  
 691 Nardi et al. (2011, Exp. 1), the frequency of correct choices  
 692 was significantly higher in the present experiment, increas-  
 693 ing from 55 % to 75 % (Fisher’s exact test,  $p < .01$ ). This  
 694 suggests that, even though we used a set of cards with fairly  
 695 subtle differences (patterns of black and white), these  
 696 objects were salient enough to be successfully used as land-  
 697 marks, improving overall reorientation performance consid-  
 698 erably relative to a basic, impoverished environment with  
 699 the slope of the floor as the only informative cue (as in Nardi  
 700 et al., 2011). However, as is shown in Fig. 3, the sample as a  
 701 whole chose the slope-based and landmark-based strategies  
 702 with approximately equal frequencies, with about one third  
 703 of the participants in each strategy group. The remaining  
 704 third of the sample fell into the neither-strategy group cate-  
 705 gory, because they did not show consistent use of a single  
 706 cue. This indicates that, in general, one type of information

## CORRELATIONS

Pearson's Correlation Coefficients  
 Correlations between Confidence Points (in parenthesis controlling for sex)  
 \* $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$

		Reliance on:		Encoding of:	
		Slope	Landmark	Slope	Landmark
Reorientation		.052 (.010)	.395 *** (.428) ***	.243 * (.217)	.508 *** (.556) ***
		Reliance on:		Encoding of:	
		Reorientation	Slope	Landmark	Slope
WLT	.259 * (.235) *	.236 * (.217)	-.061 (-.050)	.298 ** (.283) *	.085 (.103)
SOT	-.450 *** (-.415) ***	-.084 (-.043)	-.170 (-.196)	-.059 (-.024)	-.405 *** (-.450) ***

WLT = Water Level Test    SOT = Spatial Orientation Test

**Q1** **Fig. 6** Correlation tables. The Reorientation factor denotes CPs allotted to the correct corner during the two training trials (aggregated across both trials). Reliance on Slope or Landmark denotes CPs allotted to the slope-correct or the landmark-correct corner, respectively, during the two conflict trials (aggregated across both trials). Encoding of Slope and Landmark denotes CPs allotted to the correct corner during the slope and landmark tests, respectively. The top table shows correlations between these factors. In the bottom table, the water-level

test (WLT) and the spatial-orientation test (SOT) were paper-and-pencil tests on spatial abilities. The WLT assessed the use of the gravity reference frame for inferring the level of a liquid in a tilted bottle (the higher the score, the greater the use of the gravity reference frame), and the SOT assessed the ability to imagine different orientations or perspectives among objects in space (the higher the score, the larger the error)

707 did not dominate the reorientation process for everyone:  
 708 Stimulus salience was balanced between slope and land-  
 709 marks, and both types of cues enabled similarly accessible  
 710 strategies.

711 During the experiment, participants searched for a target,  
 712 making a discrete choice and allotting ten confidence points  
 713 (CPs) among the potential hiding locations. The use of a  
 714 graded measure of task performance provided us with more  
 715 information on the cognitive process of reorientation. We  
 716 focus our discussion below on three main issues.

### 717 Cue weighting

718 By adding landmarks to the slope of the environment, a new  
 719 level of complexity was introduced in the task: Which cue  
 720 would be used to reorient and locate the target, and how  
 721 would the cues be weighted in the process? Research has  
 722 addressed this type of question in the case of a continuous  
 723 search space, and it has been proposed that cues are com-  
 724 bined and weighted optimally on the basis of their variance,  
 725 according to a Bayesian model (Cheng, Shettleworth,  
 726 Huttenlocher, & Rieser, 2007; Nardini, Jones, Bedford &  
 727 Braddick, 2008). But it is also important to understand how  
 728 cues are weighted in discrete search spaces, because in  
 729 everyday life we often have to decide between *here* or *there*.

The vast majority of the literature using discrete hiding  
 locations has also employed discrete choices as the depen-  
 dent variable (a location can either be chosen or not), which  
 made it very hard to estimate the degree to which partic-  
 ipants rely on one cue as compared to another. Therefore, in  
 the present study, we were very interested in assessing how  
 participants would allot their ten CPs when the slope and  
 landmark cues predicted different target locations in the  
 conflict trials: Would participants show a combination of  
 strategies—spreading the CPs between two correct corners  
 —or would they univocally rely on one—allotting all of  
 their CPs to just one correct corner?

The average proportion of participants who, in a situa-  
 tions of conflict, were fully confident (allotting ten CPs out  
 of ten) in just one type of correct corner (either slope- or  
 landmark-correct) was more than five times larger than the  
 proportion of those who spread their confidence between the  
 two types of correct corners (57.5 % vs. 11.3 %) [ $\chi^2(1, n =$   
 $80) = 37.929, p < .001$ ; see Fig. 4]. Furthermore, excluding  
 participants who were not clearly using a strategy (i.e., the  
 neither-strategy group), the vast majority of CPs were allot-  
 ted to the chosen corner (slope- or landmark-correct), and  
 only very few to the other correct corner. These data fit a  
 scenario in which participants, in order to solve the reorien-  
 tation task, were strongly relying on just one strategy rather

755 than taking into account both types of information. The  
 756 neither-strategy group behaved differently: They divided  
 757 their cumulative CPs approximately equally between the  
 758 correct and incorrect corners, suggesting that they were not  
 759 confused by having to choose between the two possibly  
 760 correct locations—they were actually *lost* and allotted CPs  
 761 at random. Failure of the neither-strategy group to use the  
 762 available spatial information is probably why they exhibited  
 763 lower confidence and poorer performance during the training  
 764 trials.

765 Although this analysis is admittedly descriptive, the hy-  
 766 pothesis of univocal reliance on one source of information  
 767 for reorientation nicely fits with evidence from the single-  
 768 cue tests. From Fig. 5, one can see that the proportion of  
 769 participants who encoded both cues (31.3 %) is significantly  
 770 smaller (almost by half) than the combined proportion of  
 771 participants who encoded only a single cue (58.8 %) [ $\chi^2(1,$   
 772  $n = 80) = 12.222, p < .001$ ]. Even more intriguing is the fact  
 773 that, excluding the neither-strategy group, confidence for the  
 774 correct corner was negatively correlated between the two  
 775 single-cue tests; in other words, the more ~~that~~ a participant  
 776 was confident about one cue, the less confidence was  
 777 exhibited about the other cue. These findings do not fit with  
 778 a scenario in which participants encode all of the available  
 779 spatial information; they are consistent with a scenario in  
 780 which participants encode the least amount of information  
 781 (sufficient for a single strategy) necessary to solve the task.  
 782 This hypothesis is in apparent contrast with animal research,  
 783 which shows, in general, that if two cues are available for  
 784 solving a reorientation task, the subjects clearly encode both  
 785 (for birds, see Vargas, Petruso & Bingman, 2004b; for fish,  
 786 Vargas, Lopez, & Thinus-Blanc, 2004a; for rats, Cheng,  
 787 1986; for monkeys, Gouteux, Thinus-Blanc, & Vauclair,  
 788 2001; for a review, see Cheng & Newcombe, 2005).  
 789 However, it is important to note that most of these studies  
 790 were based on long training sessions, with the total number  
 791 of training trials on the order of tens. After receiving all of  
 792 this training, animals are probably at the ceiling of spatial  
 793 learning and have had enough exposure to the environment  
 794 to encode redundant cues. This was not the case in our task,  
 795 as participants only had two trials to learn the cues associ-  
 796 ated with the target location. In this condition, it makes  
 797 intuitive sense that participants did not have time to fully  
 798 encode the environment, and paid attention to just one cue.  
 799 This cognitively parsimonious model of spatial learning is  
 800 suitable for acquiring a task as quickly and effectively as  
 801 possible, and might apply also to more ecologically relevant  
 802 spatial tasks (e.g., trying to remember one's way back to a  
 803 place in a novel environment).

804 As a final note, it is possible that if, instead of the CPs,  
 805 we had used a more cognitively implicit dependent variable  
 806—a measure that required less conscious awareness of  
 807 problem-solving—it would have revealed a different pattern

of cue weighting. However, if we consider the discrete 808  
 choices made during the conflict trials (Fig. 4), 70.0 % of 809  
 the participants consistently selected the corner associated 810  
 with one cue, and only 7.5 % chose the corner associated 811  
 with slope in one trial and landmark in the other trial. 812  
 Therefore, this behavioral measure of reorientation shows 813  
 no sign of oscillation between the two potentially correct 814  
 locations, as would be expected with a strategy that used a 815  
 combination of the cues (Cheng & Newcombe, 2005). 816  
 Participants overwhelmingly stuck with one cue. 817

Correlates of reorientation 818

During the training trials, 41 % of the participants were 819  
 maximally confident (ten CPs out of ten) about the location 820  
 of the hidden target in both trials; the rest showed some 821  
 degree of uncertainty, with 36 % allotting fewer than five 822  
 CPs to the correct corner in at least one trial, and 5 % being 823  
 completely unconfident about the goal location (zero CPs 824  
 out of ten in both trials). What are the reasons for these 825  
 individual differences? 826

Performance on the reorientation task, as measured by 827  
 CPs for the target location during the training trials, corre- 828  
 lated with the four following factors. 829

1. *Sex.* Men were significantly more confident than 830  
 females about the correct hiding place. We will address 831  
 this point later, when we specifically deal with sex 832  
 differences. 833
2. *Performance on the WLT and SOT.* Even though small- 834  
 scale and large-scale spatial abilities are partially dissociat- 835  
 ed, the shared variance between these psychometric tests 836  
 and real-world reorientation confirms an underlying factor, 837  
 based on the ability to encode, use, and manipulate spatial 838  
 information (Hegarty, Montello, Richardson, Ishikawa, & 839  
 Lovelace, 2006). As a side note, the WLT and the SOT seem 840  
 to be associated with the encoding of different cues in our 841  
 experiment (see Fig. 6). In the single-cue tests, slope and 842  
 landmarks were presented in isolation, one at a time; the 843  
 CPs allotted to the corner predicted by the available cue 844  
 indicates, therefore, the extent to which participants 845  
 encoded that cue and could use it to locate the target. 846  
 Performance on the WLT correlated with the CPs allotted 847  
 to the correct corner in the slope test; the link between the 848  
 WLT and slope use was identified in our previous study 849  
 (Nardi et al., 2011), and suggests an ability to use the 850  
 vertical/gravity reference frame. In contrast, the SOT cor- 851  
 related with the landmark test, and this is probably related 852  
 to an ability to reorient among an array of objects. 853
3. *Confidence for the correct corner in both single-cue* 854  
*tests.* This correlation confirms a predictable link 855  
 between reorientation and encoding of the cues that 856  
 support it. 857

858 4. *Confidence for the landmark-correct corner in the con-*  
859 *flict tests.* In these trials, landmark and slope informa-  
860 tion determined two different correct target locations,  
861 and the CPs allotted among the corners revealed reli-  
862 ance on the landmark strategy (CPs allotted to the  
863 landmark-correct corner), the slope strategy (CPs allot-  
864 ted to the slope-correct corner), or neither strategy (CPs  
865 allotted to incorrect corners). Therefore, posing the cor-  
866 relation in other terms, participant who weighted more  
867 heavily the landmark strategy were also more confident  
868 in solving the reorientation task; on the contrary, those  
869 relying more heavily on the slope strategy were not  
870 necessarily more confident in the task. Therefore, at  
871 least in a relatively small environment, the landmarks  
872 employed in our experiment seemed to sustain a more  
873 effective and confident reorientation process. This could  
874 be related to the nature of landmarks as a reference  
875 frame. In our task, in order to locate the target using  
876 landmarks, it would have sufficed to learn an associa-  
877 tion between a specific card and the target (not neces-  
878 sarily the card at the correct corner; e.g., “the target is in  
879 the corner opposite that card”). This might be a com-  
880 paratively simpler process than using the slope gradient.  
881 In a square, tilted environment like the one that we used,  
882 research has shown that a goal location is represented  
883 with a mixed reference frame: The target is mainly  
884 encoded as uphill or downhill (allocentric), and the  
885 left–right coordinate is encoded egocentrically relative  
886 to the participant’s body (e.g., facing downhill, the goal  
887 is on my left; Nardi et al., 2011; Weisberg, Nardi,  
888 Newcombe, & Shipley, 2012). The hypothesis of land-  
889 marks being a more helpful cue is also supported by  
890 previous research on directional (including slope) ver-  
891 sus positional (landmark) cues within a virtual environ-  
892 ment (VE). When training with only one type of cue,  
893 landmarks lead to more accurate goal searching, as  
894 compared to directional cues (Chai & Jacobs, 2009);  
895 furthermore, after training with both types of cues,  
896 removing positional cues causes a significant decrease  
897 in searching efficiency, whereas removing directional  
898 cues does not (Chai & Jacobs, 2010). Taken together,  
899 this evidence argues for landmark strategies giving a  
900 stronger contribution to reorientation and goal-  
901 searching performance—at least in a small-scale envi-  
902 ronment—as compared to strategies based on direction-  
903 al cues (including terrain slope).

#### 904 Sex differences

905 With a relatively large sample size and by analyzing both  
906 discrete choices and CPs—which provide a more graded  
907 measure of behavior—we identified evidence in support of

sex differences in only two areas. One was in the slope test, 908  
in which men were affected by conflict trial order (regular 909  
vs. inverse), but women were not. During the conflict trials, 910  
in a vertical displacement the correct landmark/card would 911  
assume a different position along the vertical axis of the 912  
slope gradient (an opposite elevation; if it used to be uphill, 913  
now it would be downhill); because the vertical axis of a 914  
slope is more salient than the horizontal (J. W. Kelly, 2011; 915  
Nardi et al., 2011), a vertical displacement causes a larger 916  
conflict than does a horizontal displacement. Receiving the 917  
larger conflict situation first in the conflict trials (inverse 918  
order) might have increased the participants’ awareness of 919  
the slope to a greater degree than receiving the larger con- 920  
flict second (regular order); this higher slope awareness 921  
could have determined the greater confidence for the correct 922  
corner when only slope was available (in the slope test). The 923  
fact that only men showed this effect suggests that the sexes 924  
had different sensitivities to conflict situations. 925

More interesting is the finding that in the reorientation 926  
task (training trials), men allotted significantly more CPs to 927  
the correct location. This disparity, however, was attenuated 928  
in the discrete choices. Considering both the trial-by-trial 929  
analyses and the overall number of correct choices during 930  
training, sex differences were not significant, although they 931  
trended in the same direction. In comparison, in our previ- 932  
ous study (Nardi et al., 2011), women showed significantly 933  
less accurate discrete choices after only two training trials. 934  
Therefore, in the present experiment it seems that women, 935  
rather than underperforming, showed more uncertainty 936  
when solving the task. The literature on spatial abilities 937  
abounds with reports of sex differences in performance, 938  
most of which are in favor of males (D. M. Kelly & 939  
Bischof, 2005; Moffat, Hampson, & Hatzipantelis, 1998; 940  
Sandstrom, Kaufman, & Huettel, 1998; Saucier et al., 941  
2002; Schinazi et al., 2009; Voyer et al., 1995). However, 942  
women have also been shown to display inferior spatial 943  
confidence (in a cognitive mapping task, O’Laughlin & 944  
Brubaker, 1998; in way-finding, Lawton, Charleston, & 945  
Zieles, 1996; in distance estimation, Foley & Cohen, 946  
1984), lower self-reported spatial skills (e.g., SBSOD; 947  
Hegarty et al., 2006), as well as greater levels of spatial 948  
anxiety (Lawton, 1994; Lawton & Kallai, 2002). 949  
Importantly, factors relating to spatial confidence can alter 950  
spatial behavior, which, depending on the variable used in 951  
the task, may lead to sex differences in performance 952  
(Lavenex & Lavenex, 2010; Lawton et al., 1996). For ex- 953  
ample, a lack of confidence can be associated with increased 954  
exploratory behavior, possibly causing longer latencies and 955  
perseveration errors (Lavenex & Lavenex, 2010). To the 956  
best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to show 957  
evidence of inferior confidence for women in reorientation, 958  
reinforcing the view of spatial confidence as a sex-typed 959  
quality dissociable from spatial ability. 960

961 Except for these differences, men and women behaved  
962 similarly when we took into account both the discrete choices  
963 and CPs allotted in the conflict tests and the single-cue tests.  
964 Importantly, we did not find convincing evidence in support of  
965 different reliance on slope or landmark cues. Considering  
966 discrete choices, the frequency of participants in each strategy  
967 group differed between sexes by only seven participants in the  
968 slope-strategy group, and by five participants in the landmark-  
969 strategy group (see Fig. 3); furthermore, the numbers of slope-  
970 correct choices (or landmark-correct choices) during the con-  
971 flict trials were not significantly different between men and  
972 women. Moreover, when considering the CPs allotted to the  
973 slope-correct or landmark-correct corners, there was not a  
974 significant difference between sexes. The lack of significantly  
975 different cue preferences extended to the single-cue tests: Men  
976 and women did not show a sex-specific encoding of cues—  
977 relative to either discrete choices or CPs (see Fig. 5). It should  
978 be noted that, in all of these analyses, the data trended toward  
979 slight, nonsignificant, but consistent preferential uses of slope  
980 by men and of landmarks by women. Similar strategy differ-  
981 ences, with men relying more on directional cues (mainly  
982 terrain slope) than do women, have been found to be statisti-  
983 cally significant when using a VE (Chai & Jacobs, 2009,  
984 2010). In this regard, it is important to note that these studies  
985 used sample sizes comparable to ours (84 participants in Chai  
986 & Jacobs, 2009; 51 participants in Chai & Jacobs, 2010).  
987 Furthermore, we estimated from the published results that  
988 the effect sizes found—according to Cohen's (1988) conven-  
989 tion—ranged from “medium” (Cohen's  $f = .28$  for Chai &  
990 Jacobs, 2009) to “large” (Cohen's  $w = .49$  for Chai & Jacobs,  
991 2010). For our sample size, the statistical powers to detect  
992 similar-sized effects were .6 and .9, respectively (Erdfelder,  
993 Faul, & Buchner, 1996). Therefore, it is unlikely that the lack  
994 of a significant strategy difference in our study was due simply  
995 to low power. We believe that using a real-terrain slope, which  
996 could be walked, increased the salience of the direction-  
997 al cue as compared to a virtual slope presented on a  
998 computer monitor, making this cue more accessible to  
999 use. It has been shown that the size of computer dis-  
1000 plays can affect sex differences in virtual navigation:  
1001 When a smaller display is used and less optic flow is  
1002 provided, the female disadvantage is significantly in-  
1003 creased (Tan, Czerwinski, & Robertson, 2006). In the  
1004 same way, the slope strategy might have been less  
1005 readily available for the women in the VE studies  
1006 (Chai & Jacobs, 2009, 2010) because the sensory infor-  
1007 mation associated with the slope gradient was impoverished  
1008 (vestibular and kinesthetic cues were not provided). In sum,  
1009 the sex differences in strategy use found in VE seem to  
1010 generalize weakly, if at all, to a real environment, or, put in a  
1011 different way, sex-specific preferences for directional (slope)  
1012 and positional (landmark) cues seem to be accentuated in  
1013 virtual as compared to real environments.

## Conclusions

1014  
1015 The present study builds on our previous one (Nardi et al.,  
1016 2011) and has important implications regarding reorienta-  
1017 tion and slope use. In the previous study, women exhibited  
1018 difficulty dealing with slope when that was the only cue  
1019 available for reorientation. As compared to men, perfor-  
1020 mance in the task was worse, and the time required to  
1021 correctly identify the uphill side of the enclosure was longer.  
1022 The present study suggests that the female disadvantage is  
1023 not due to an inherent lower preference for using slope when  
1024 other effective strategies are available; from a different  
1025 perspective, it suggests that, even if males have an advan-  
1026 tage with slope, when given a choice of cues to use, their  
1027 preference for slope is not significantly higher as compared  
1028 to females, and a substantial proportion of men—not signif-  
1029 icantly different from that of women—prefer to use land-  
1030 marks. Furthermore, the present study does not support a  
1031 role of footwear habits. Women are used to wearing heeled  
1032 shoes more often than men; this might impair the sensitivity  
1033 to slope as a consequence of reduced perceived foot tilt. In  
1034 our previous work, we found that the footwear worn at the  
1035 time of the experiment did not affect women's performance.  
1036 However, an unanswered question was whether *prior experi-*  
1037 *ence* with heeled footwear had a role. With the question-  
1038 naire on heel experience, in the present study, we addressed  
1039 this issue. The questionnaire did not correlate with any  
1040 measure in the experiment; in particular, the frequency and  
1041 the variety of heel heights used did not show any relation  
1042 with either reliance on or encoding of slope information.  
1043 This suggests that footwear habits cannot be held account-  
1044 able for the female difficulty with slope. So, which factors  
1045 are responsible?

1046 The evidence accumulated to date seems to indicate that  
1047 the female disadvantage is associated with perceptual/atten-  
1048 tional factors, possibly related to lower sensitivity to vestib-  
1049 ular information (Sholl, 1989) and to the kinesthetic  
1050 component of slope perception (Weisberg et al., 2012); in  
1051 addition, the difficulty could be due to experience  
1052 (familiarity) with directional cues in general (consistent with  
1053 our finding from the questionnaire on experience with di-  
1054 rectional cues, which showed a marginally significant sex  
1055 difference on one question). Further research will be needed  
1056 to explore these possible causes. However, the present study  
1057 highlights another plausible factor: The female difficulty  
1058 reorienting with only slope could also derive from lower  
1059 spatial confidence. In Nardi et al. (2011), uncertainty for the  
1060 target location could have led, over a series of four trials, to  
1061 more hesitation and an increased amount of errors, deterio-  
1062 rating women's performance; in addition, when having to  
1063 point to the uphill direction of the slope gradient, lower  
1064 confidence could have caused women to assume a more  
1065 conservative criterion of response, resulting in longer



1066 response times. In the present study, instead, because confi-  
 1067 dence was recorded separately from discrete choices,  
 1068 females did not suffer inferior performance, but still showed  
 1069 greater uncertainty reorienting. In this respect, it is extreme-  
 1070 ly interesting that women exhibited lower confidence even  
 1071 though a landmark strategy was available—a strategy that is  
 1072 considered simple (Ratliff & Newcombe, 2008) and, if  
 1073 anything, is supposedly more female-related (Galea &  
 1074 Kimura, 1993; Jacobs & Schenk, 2003; Ward, Newcombe,  
 1075 & Overton, 1986). This suggests that spatial confidence  
 1076 might affect performance in a very wide range of conditions,  
 1077 even when potentially more accessible strategies are avail-  
 1078 able. Future studies should take this into account and exam-  
 1079 ine more extensively the effects of spatial confidence on  
 1080 spatial abilities.

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